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JUSTICE BEYOND DISPUTE 
DIGITAL JUSTICE: TECHNOLOGY AND THE INTERNET OF DISPUTES.  
By Ethan Katsh and Orna Rabinovich-Einy.  New York, N.Y.: Oxford 
University Press.  2017.  Pp. xi, 910.  $24.95. 
Reviewed by Mary Anne Franks∗ 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Jiranuch Triratana was watching her brother scroll through his  
Facebook feed on April 24, 2017, when they came upon a startling live-
stream broadcast.  It was from Jiranuch’s boyfriend, Wuttisan 
Wongtalay.1  He was filming himself and the couple’s eleven-month-old 
daughter, Natalie, from the roof of a building.2  There was a rope tied 
around Natalie’s neck.3  As Jiranuch and her brother watched in horror, 
Wongtalay dropped the infant off the side of the building.4  Jiranuch 
alerted the police, who found the lifeless bodies of Natalie and her father 
hanging from ropes off the side of an abandoned hotel in Phuket a few 
hours later.5  Wongtalay had killed his daughter and then himself.6  
Wongtalay’s smartphone was propped up against a nearby wall.7 
The two Facebook Live videos showing Wongtalay murdering his 
daughter were available on the platform for roughly twenty-four hours.8  
Before Facebook removed them, one video had been viewed 112,000 
times and the other 258,000 times.9  Both had been uploaded to 
YouTube.10  Facebook responded with a statement that called the killing 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 ∗ Professor of Law, University of Miami School of Law. 
 1 Agence France-Presse, Thai Mother Saw Daughter Being Killed on Facebook Live, THE 
GUARDIAN (Apr. 27, 2017, 2:49 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/apr/27/thai-
mother-watched-daughter-being-killed-on-facebook-live [https://perma.cc/KFK6-5UXK]. 
 2 Patpicha Tanakasempipat & Panarat Thepgumpanat, Thai Man Broadcasts Baby Daughter’s 
Murder Live on Facebook, REUTERS (Apr. 25, 2017, 7:47 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-
thailand-facebook-murder-idUSKBN17R1DG [https://perma.cc/G54T-G2S7]. 
 3 Agence France-Presse, supra note 1. 
 4 Tanakasempipat & Thepgumpanat, supra note 2. 
 5 Agence France-Presse, supra note 1. 
 6 Id. 
 7 Shira Rubin, Thai Man Kills Baby Daughter, Then Himself, Live on Facebook, VOCATIV 
(Apr. 25, 2017, 11:05 AM), http://www.vocativ.com/424039/thai-man-kills-daughter-facebook-live/ 
[https://perma.cc/M9UP-GBZ2]. 
 8 Tanakasempipat & Thepgumpanat, supra note 2. 
 9 Id. 
 10 Jessica Guynn, Father Livestreams Killing of Infant Daughter on Facebook Live, USA TODAY 
(Apr. 25, 2017, 12:59 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/news/2017/04/25/father-
livestreams-killing-infant-daughter-facebook-live/100884906/ [https://perma.cc/MLX8-KNSF]. 
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“an appalling incident” and asserted that “[t]here is absolutely no place 
for acts of this kind on Facebook.”11 
But acts of this kind have found a place on Facebook with increasing 
frequency.  At least sixty violent incidents have been broadcast on  
Facebook Live, the company’s live-streaming service, between its 
launch in December 2015 and April 2017.12  The incidents include 
“shootings, rapes, murders, child abuse, torture, suicides, and attempted 
suicides.”13  In January 2017, a Facebook Live video of four people in 
Chicago beating a bound and gagged mentally disabled teenager, at one 
point cutting into his scalp with a knife,14 was left up for “at least 23 
hours and was viewed more than 16,000 times before Facebook’s re-
viewers intervened.”15  In March 2017, at least forty people watched the 
gang rape of a fifteen-year-old girl on Facebook Live, none of whom 
called the police.16  In May 2017, a thirty-three-year-old man who had 
recently been arrested for trying to kill his ex-girlfriend turned on Face-
book Live just before he doused himself in kerosene, ran into the bar 
where she worked, and set himself on fire in front of her.17 
One of the highest-profile cases of violence involving Facebook Live 
unfolded in Cleveland on Easter Sunday in 2017.  That day, Steve  
Stephens posted a video to Facebook declaring his intention to commit 
murder.18  A few minutes later, he posted a video of himself approaching 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 11 Id. 
 12 Edgar Alvarez, Murders, Suicides and Rapes: Facebook’s Major Video Problem, ENGADGET 
(Apr. 18, 2017), https://www.engadget.com/2017/04/18/facebook-video-steve-stephens/ [https:// 
perma.cc/JM78-YVGQ]; see also Alex Kantrowitz, Violence on Facebook Live Is Worse than You 
Thought, BUZZFEED (June 16, 2017, 10:17 AM), https://www.buzzfeed.com/alexkantrowitz/heres-
how-bad-facebook-lives-violence-problem-is [https://perma.cc/5A3Y-GJBG]. 
 13 Kantrowitz, supra note 12. 
 14 Steve Schmadeke et al., Four Ordered Held Without Bail in Alleged Hate-Crime Attack 
Streamed Live on Facebook, CHI. TRIB. (Jan. 6, 2017, 8:50 PM), http://www. 
chicagotribune.com/news/local/breaking/ct-facebook-live-attack-charges-met-20170106-story.html 
[https://perma.cc/BGM7-ELSC]. 
 15 Deepa Seetharaman, Facebook, Rushing into Live Video, Wasn’t Ready for Its Dark Side, 
WALL ST. J. (Mar. 6, 2017, 2:05 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/in-rush-to-live-video-facebook-
moved-fast-and-broke-things-1488821247 [https://perma.cc/S7YA-D6LU]. 
 16 Phil McCausland & Associated Press, Teen Who Was Gang Raped on Facebook Live Is Re-
ceiving Threats, Mom Says, NBC NEWS (Mar. 22, 2017, 6:19 PM), http://www. 
nbcnews.com/news/us-news/teen-who-was-gang-raped-facebook-live-receiving-threats-mom-
n737356 [https://perma.cc/8BHM-AZGF]. 
 17 Shehab Khan, Man Dies After Setting Himself on Fire During Facebook Live Stream, THE 
INDEPENDENT (May 15, 2017, 9:08 PM), http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/ 
facebook-live-man-dies-sets-self-on-fire-suicide-stream-a7737621.html [https://perma.cc/L6R2-HK9A]; 
see also Kristine Phillips & Peter Holley, He Doused Himself with Kerosene on Facebook Live — 
Then Ran into a Bar in Flames, WASH. POST (May 15, 2017), https://www. 
washingtonpost.com/news/true-crime/wp/2017/05/15/he-doused-himself-with-kerosene-on- 
facebook-live-then-ran-into-a-bar-in-flames/ [https://perma.cc/HJ7H-LANE]. 
 18 Elizabeth Dwoskin & Craig Timberg, Facebook Wanted “Visceral” Live Video.  It’s Getting 
Live-Streaming Killers and Suicides, WASH. POST (Apr. 17, 2017), https://www. 
washingtonpost.com/business/technology/facebook-wanted-visceral-live-video-its-getting-suicides-
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an elderly man, later identified as Robert Godwin, Sr., and asking him 
to say a woman’s name.19  After Godwin, who appeared confused by 
the request, said the name,20 Stephens told him, “She’s the reason that 
this is about to happen to you.”21  Stephens then fatally shot Godwin in 
the head.22  A few minutes later, Stephens used Facebook Live to broad-
cast himself confessing to murder.23  According to Facebook, Stephens’s 
Facebook account was disabled a few hours after he posted the first 
video.  By then, the video of the murder had been posted across the 
platform and on other social media sites.24  Within hours of the killing, 
one post of the video had been viewed 1.6 million times.25 
The outcry over Facebook Live videos of graphic murders, rapes, 
and beatings has been passionate and sustained.  Godwin’s grandson 
begged people to “show some respect” and stop sharing the video of his 
grandfather’s murder,26 highlighting the agony inflicted on family mem-
bers when such tragedies go viral.  Psychologists have observed that 
being repeatedly exposed to acts of violence can lead to desensitization 
or to “secondary trauma,” which suggests that watching real-life videos 
of murder, rape, and other violence can cause lasting psychological dam-
age.27  This danger is particularly acute for social media content mod-
erators who are tasked with viewing violent, disturbing videos for hours 
on end.28  Experts warn that live-streaming technology like Facebook 
Live “serves in some cases as an impetus to some people” to commit acts 
of violence.29  Criminals obtaining notoriety through live streaming, 




 19 Jane Morice, Facebook Killer Chooses Victim at Random, Laughs About Killing in Videos, 
CLEVELAND.COM (Apr. 16, 2017), http://www.cleveland.com/metro/index.ssf/2017/04/accused_ 
facebook_live_killer_c.html [https://perma.cc/R7LL-FMNT]. 
 20 Id. 
 21 Melissa Chan, What to Know About Cleveland Facebook Murder Suspect Steve Stephens, 
TIME (Apr. 17, 2017, 3:27 PM), http://time.com/4742204/steve-stephens-cleveland-shooting- 
facebook/ [https://perma.cc/H9EQ-72GM]. 
 22 Id. 
 23 Dwoskin & Timberg, supra note 18. 
 24 Id. 
 25 Courtney Astolfi, Social Media Users Urge Against Sharing Facebook Video of Cleveland 
Killing, CLEVELAND.COM (Apr. 16, 2017), http://www.cleveland.com/metro/index.ssf/2017/04/so-
cial_media_users_urge_agains.html [https://perma.cc/HYU9-YVRX]. 
 26 Id.  
 27 Olivia Solon, Facebook Is Hiring Moderators.  But Is the Job Too Gruesome to Handle?, THE 
GUARDIAN (May 4, 2017, 5:00 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/may/04/face-
book-content-moderators-ptsd-psychological-dangers [https://perma.cc/B8B5-7MYD]. 
 28 Id. 
 29 See Rod Chester, Facebook to Hire 3000 People to Stop Violence and Suicide in Streaming 
Live Video, NEWS.COM.AU (May 4, 2017, 7:32 AM), http://www.news.com.au/technology/online/ 
social/facebook-to-hire-3000-people-to-spot-and-stop-violence-and-suicide-in-streaming-live-
video/news-story/8202db56d8d9764d4ee85c179ef72e15 [https://perma.cc/M7UH-M3B8].  
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violence.30  The longer a video remains on a platform, the larger the 
audience it will reach and the more likely it is that it will migrate to 
other sites.  For all of these reasons, critics have suggested that Facebook 
should act faster to take down violent live streams,31 impose a time de-
lay for broadcasts similar to the seven-second delay television networks 
use for broadcasting live events,32 or get rid of its live-streaming service 
altogether.33 
Facebook founder Mark Zuckerberg, speaking at the company’s an-
nual developer conference two days after the video of Godwin’s murder 
went viral, made only a brief reference to the incident, saying “we will 
keep doing all we can to prevent tragedies like this from happening” 
before moving on to discuss the company’s plans for augmented-reality 
technology.34  The criticism over Facebook Live did not abate, intensi-
fying after the video of Wongtalay’s murder of his daughter went viral 
a little more than a week later.35  On May 3, 2017, Zuckerberg offered 
a more substantive response to the outcry, stating on the Facebook web-
site that the company would add 3000 moderators “to review the mil-
lions of reports we get every week, and improve the process for doing it 
quickly.”36 
Given that live-stream content must still first be flagged by a user 
before a moderator can review it, the only way that removals can be 
done more quickly and effectively is for more users to watch and flag 
more traumatizing content.  Adding more moderators may speed up the 
process at the secondary stage, but ultimately the burden is — that is, 
remains — on users.  Such a response does nothing to address the fun-
damental problem Facebook created with its live-stream service.  “Pure” 
live streaming — zero-delay broadcasting — is by design impossible to 
moderate in any meaningful way.  A system that allows content to be 
broadcasted unless and until flagged by a user and reviewed by a mod-
erator is a system that will inevitably put rapes, suicides, and murders 
into public view.  Videos of such gruesome acts only need to be available 
for a few seconds to go viral, at which point removal by the original 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 30 Gillian Mohney, Murder on Facebook Spotlights Rise of “Performance Crime” Phenomenon 
on Social Media, ABC NEWS (Apr. 18, 2017, 4:47 PM), http://abcnews.go.com/US/murder-
facebook-spotlights-rise-performance-crime-phenomenon-social/story?id=46862306 
[https://perma.cc/K2MN-L3R6]. 
 31 See, e.g., Kantrowitz, supra note 12. 
 32 See, e.g., Alvarez, supra note 12. 
 33 See, e.g., Seetharaman, supra note 15. 
 34 Nancy Dillon, Mark Zuckerberg Glosses over Steve Stephens’ Viral Facebook Murder in Con-
ference Talk, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Apr. 18, 2017, 3:33 PM), http://www.nydailynews.com/news/ 
national/facebook-lot-work-live-murder-video-ceo-article-1.3069887 [https://perma.cc/RU23-TA3M]. 
 35 Samuel Gibbs, Facebook Under Pressure After Man Livestreams Killing of His Daughter, 
THE GUARDIAN (Apr. 25, 2017, 11:38 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/technol-
ogy/2017/apr/25/facebook-thailand-man-livestreams-killing-daughter [https://perma.cc/P4U5-
MZXH]. 
 36 Mark Zuckerberg, FACEBOOK (May 3, 2017), https://www.facebook.com/zuck/posts/ 
10103695315624661 [https://perma.cc/C28V-3DYU]. 
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platform will have limited impact.  Increasing the number of people 
assigned to a futile task does not make the task any less futile; it merely 
increases the number of people who will be subjected to traumatizing 
content. 
Professors Ethan Katsh and Orna Rabinovich-Einy’s new book, Dig-
ital Justice: Technology and the Internet of Disputes, does not discuss 
Facebook Live, but it does praise what the authors call Facebook’s ef-
forts to meet the problem of “anti-social media” (p. 109).  Facebook’s 
implementation of a dispute resolution system that allows users to work 
out conflicts among themselves demonstrates, according to the authors, 
an “advanced understanding of the role of dispute systems design” (p. 
121).  This dispute system allows users to communicate directly with 
each other about behavior they find offensive, “explaining how it makes 
them feel and what actions they would like to be taken by their coun-
terpart” (p. 120).  While the authors acknowledge that the process can 
give rise to other disputes and has the potential to be abused, it none-
theless “reflects a recognition of the significance of dispute resolution 
processes that create a space for users to discuss problems, feelings, and 
desired outcomes” (p. 121).  In doing so, Facebook eschews a deci-
sionmaking role and “allows instead for direct user-to-user negotiation” 
(p. 121). 
Digital Justice is a book about “online dispute resolution,” also 
known as ODR, and is primarily focused on disputes among parties who 
have voluntarily entered into relationships that were intended to serve 
common interests but have broken down at some point (p. 113).  Many 
transactional and commercial disputes can be characterized in this way, 
as can relational disputes involving parties of roughly equal standing:  
e-commerce transactions between buyers and sellers, medical record cor-
rections between patients and hospitals, child custody proceedings be-
tween the parents, and workplace disagreements.  In pro-social disputes, 
the interests of corporate or institutional entities and individual parties 
usually align in some way: online commercial enterprises want custom-
ers to continue using their service, hospitals are invested in the accuracy 
of patient files, the parents of a child want to agree on custody arrange-
ments, employers prefer peaceful workplaces.  In these kinds of pro-
social interactions, the parties are united by a shared appetite for dispute 
resolution (p. 113).  When disputes arise in these interactions, values 
such as convenience (p. 37), speed (pp. 74–75), user control (pp. 120–21), 
and a preference for systematic solutions (pp. 34–36) are particularly 
valuable in achieving resolution.  Most importantly, online dispute res-
olution emphasizes technology’s role as a “Fourth Party” that has the 
capacity to enhance all of these virtues (pp. 37–38). 
The most intense and damaging social media conflicts, however, can 
be described as aggressively anti-social.  As Katsh and Rabinovich-Einy 
observe in Chapter 5, “The Challenge of Social and Anti-Social Media,” 
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social media conflicts can be more challenging than other kinds of con-
flicts because they “have almost none of the qualities or systems” that 
are useful in resolving commercial disputes (p. 114).  Transactional dis-
putes often arise out of misunderstandings and accidents that can be 
corrected relatively easily, whereas social media conflicts often involve 
intentionally malicious acts (p. 114).  What is more, the kind of auto-
mated infrastructure often available in transactional disputes, for exam-
ple, credit card “chargeback” systems, is not available for social media 
disputes (p. 114). 
While noting that significant differences in the nature of transac-
tional disputes and social media disputes make the latter more resistant 
in some ways to dispute resolution, Katsh and Rabinovich-Einy none-
theless endorse ODR as an effective approach to anti-social conflicts as 
well as pro-social conflicts.  Indeed, as the title of their book indicates, 
they believe that ODR is not merely a useful tool for resolving transac-
tional disputes, but a broad practice that can help produce “digital jus-
tice.”  But the authors’ discussion of how ODR can and should be ap-
plied to anti-social disputes exposes the severe limitations of this vision 
of justice.  
The authors distinguish between commercial or transactional dis-
putes and what they call “relationship disputes.”  The primary differ-
ence, in their view, is that the latter is more emotional than the former.  
Katsh and Rabinovich-Einy describe relationship disputes as often in-
volving “actual friends” or at least “people who know each other,” who 
have “done something online to anger or embarrass the other party” (p. 
115).  In commercial disputes, which often involve monetary loss, “res-
titution is often sufficient to achieve a resolution” (p. 115).  By contrast, 
“relationship disputes often require attention to emotions,” especially  
anger (p. 115). 
This characterization, which conjures up short-lived tiffs between 
impulsive teenagers, is a caricature of online conflict.  The examples of 
anti-social conflicts that the authors themselves provide make the inap-
propriateness of this characterization clear.  Such a description does not 
fit death threats, rape threats, defamation, revenge porn (the unauthor-
ized disclosure of sexually explicit imagery), and doxxing (the publica-
tion of private information online with the purpose of harassing the tar-
get) (p. 118),37 nor does it fit live-streamed suicides, terrorist 
propaganda, conspiracy theories, and misinformation campaigns.   
Victims of online abuse withdraw from civic life, develop PTSD and 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 37 Online abuse is disproportionately aimed at women, racial and religious minorities, and les-
bian, gay, bisexual, and transgender individuals.  See Danny O’Brien & Dia Kayyali, Facing the 
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depression, lose jobs, flee their homes, change their names, and commit 
suicide.38  To characterize social media conflicts as emotional “relation-
ship disputes” stemming from “embarrassing” behavior (p. 115) is nei-
ther accurate nor respectful to the victims of such abuse.  
Social media disputes present challenges for dispute resolution not 
because they involve emotion, but because they involve exploitation.  
Though Katsh and Rabinovich-Einy claim to be concerned with justice, 
they seem curiously unconcerned by the fact that anti-social online be-
havior generates benefits and costs that are unequally distributed across 
society.  But the ability of some groups to profit — financially or other-
wise — from the misery of other groups should be incompatible with 
any intelligible concept of justice. 
Katsh and Rabinovich-Einy do specify that they are concerned with 
procedural, as opposed to substantive, justice.39  While procedural jus-
tice is a vitally important value, it is also an inherently limited one that 
presumes the legitimacy of a given legal or social order.  If an underlying 
legal or social order is itself unjust, focusing on fairness within that order 
is at best nonresponsive and at worst complicit in injustice.  A proce-
dural justice focus within a system based on exploitation risks natural-
izing and depoliticizing that exploitation. 
The goal of Digital Justice, according to the authors, is to clarify not 
only “how technology generates disputes of all types” but also “how tech-
nology can be employed to resolve and prevent them” (p. 3).  In other 
words, the authors believe that technology can solve the problems cre-
ated by technology.  While this is a pragmatic and useful approach in 
many contexts, it is also, in essence, a form of technological determinism.  
Technological determinists assume that society should conform itself to 
the dictates of technology rather than the other way around.40  Katsh 
and Rabinovich-Einy’s technological determinism is evident in their em-
brace of the ODR metaphor of technology as a “Fourth Party” aiding 
conflict resolution (p. 37).  This position fails to adequately recognize the 
degree to which technology itself is an antagonistic party in many online 
disputes, and how the powerful entities that currently exert near-mo-
nopoly control over this technology are fundamentally compromised 
with regard to conflict resolution. 
Viewing technology primarily as a solution rather than a problem 
erases the political and cultural values embedded in technological prac-
tices.  Technological determinists do not question whether any particular 
technology should have come into existence or should stay in existence; 
technological advancement is taken as an inevitability to which humans 
can adapt in more or less efficient ways.  Katsh and Rabinovich-Einy’s 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 38 See DANIELLE KEATS CITRON, HATE CRIMES IN CYBERSPACE 5–12 (2014). 
 39 The authors state early on: “[W]e use the term ‘justice’ primarily in a procedural sense, much 
in the same way it has been used by the ‘access to justice’ literature” (p. 3). 
 40 LELIA GREEN, THE INTERNET 8 (2010). 
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technological determinism leads them to pay inadequate attention to 
three key asymmetries at play in the most intensely anti-social online 
interactions: asymmetries of consent, power, and labor.  These three 
asymmetries are not only exploited by malicious users, but also by online 
“intermediaries” — corporations such as Facebook, Google, and  
Twitter — to maximize their profits. 
Consent: Unlike commercial disputes, online conflicts are often com-
pletely one-sided.  Stalkers, harassers, Gamergate trolls, and purveyors 
of revenge porn are not engaged in mutual activities.  Rather, they force 
unwilling targets into destructive interactions.  Similarly, people who 
live stream murders, disseminate terrorist propaganda videos, or spread 
conspiracy theories impose harmful content on unsuspecting users of 
social media and internet services. 
Power: The perpetrators of online abuse wield more power than do 
their victims.  While perpetrators often remain anonymous, their targets 
are denied that privilege.  Accordingly, perpetrators are shielded from 
the consequences of their actions while victims are forced to contend 
with the effects of being exposed.41  Perpetration often emboldens abus-
ers and attracts supportive fellow travelers, while victimization silences 
and isolates victims.42 
Labor: Online abuse forces victims to act.  Filling out complaint 
forms, filing police reports, running constant internet searches on their 
names, sending takedown notices — all of these steps take time, energy, 
and often financial resources.  Online abuse effectively compels victims 
to provide free labor to try to protect themselves.  An online abuser can 
inflict massive damage with a click of a button, whereas his victim may 
have to commit to hours of distressing, repetitive, and often ultimately 
fruitless work to mitigate the harm. 
Unlike the commercial or institutional actors in pro-social disputes, 
social media platforms in anti-social disputes often have no incentive to 
resolve or prevent the conflicts at issue.  They may in fact have incen-
tives to ignore or even to aggravate them.  This is due in large part to 
the business model of many social media companies.  They do not make 
money by selling products; they make money by selling ads.  Increased 
engagement with their platforms, whether for pro-social or anti-social 
purposes, translates into increased profits: “[A]busive posts still bring in 
considerable ad revenue and the more content that is posted, good or 
bad, the more ad money goes into their coffers.”43  This can create in-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 41 See, e.g., CITRON, supra note 38, at 5–10. 
 42 See id. at 5. 
 43 Kalev Leetaru, Do Social Media Platforms Really Care About Online Abuse?, FORBES (Jan. 
12, 2017, 11:46 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/kalevleetaru/2017/01/12/do-social-media- 
platforms-really-care-about-online-abuse/#58ea898345f1 [https://perma.cc/K3DK-BR4R]. 
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centives for platforms to be indifferent to or even encouraging of ine-
qualities of power among users.  For some of these platforms, online 
abuse may be, as the saying goes, “not a bug but a feature.”44 
This is another way of saying that online intermediaries like  
Facebook, Google, and Twitter themselves aggravate and exploit asym-
metries of consent, power, and labor.  Many technology platforms have 
become so ubiquitous and powerful as to be virtually inescapable.  A 
person who has not chosen to use Google’s search engine is nonetheless 
subject to Google’s indexing practices.  A person who has not joined 
Facebook or Twitter can nonetheless be targeted by users on those sites.  
Even when users have voluntarily engaged with a platform, the plat-
form’s power greatly outstrips the individual or even collective power 
of users.  Byzantine terms of service and invisible data collection prac-
tices ensure that the platform always has more power over users than 
users have over the platform.  The most successful online services, more-
over, are primarily products of users’ free labor.  Google does not create 
the web that it indexes; Facebook and Twitter do not write the posts 
that they promote.  When disputes and controversies arise, the burden 
is almost always on users to perform the work to address them, whether 
that is flagging live-streamed murders or reporting revenge porn.  
Online abuse is rarely extricable from the technology used to facili-
tate it; in many cases, to paraphrase Marshall McLuhan, the medium is 
the abuse.45  Katsh and Rabinovich-Einy’s online dispute resolution ap-
proach places the most vital questions about technology beyond dispute: 
Who reaps its benefits?  What values are embedded in its design?  
Whose labor does it exploit?  Should it exist at all?  The technological-
determinist framework shifts attention away from political and cultural 
questions of inequality and power toward questions of data and effi-
ciency.  The justice of technological determinism is, therefore, an impov-
erished form of justice.  Justice cannot be achieved in the most destruc-
tive and widespread anti-social conflicts without an unflinching 
assessment of consent, power, and labor; reflection on the compromised 
nature of online intermediaries; and repudiation of technological  
determinism. 
Part II of this Review examines how and why online dispute resolu-
tion can be productive for pro-social disputes.  Part III argues that the 
technological determinism inherent in Katsh and Rabinovich-Einy’s vi-
sion of ODR makes its application to anti-social disputes counterpro-
ductive and destructive. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 44 See generally It’s Not a Bug, It’s a Feature, URBAN DICTIONARY (Sept. 14, 2012), 
https://www.urbandictionary.com/define.php?term=It%27s%20not%20a%20bug%2C%20it%27s% 
20a%20feature [https://perma.cc/56HF-P452]. 
 45 See MARSHALL MCLUHAN, UNDERSTANDING MEDIA 7 (1964). 
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II.  PRO-SOCIAL DISPUTES 
The purpose of Digital Justice, according to the authors, is “to clarify 
not only how technology generates disputes but how technology can be 
employed to resolve and prevent disputes” (p. 3).  Increasingly sophisti-
cated technology produces increasingly sophisticated conflicts, but our 
tools for addressing these conflicts have not evolved as quickly.  The 
authors aim to address the gap between progressively complex disputes 
and stagnating dispute resolution systems (p. 3).  The tool they propose 
for doing so is Online Dispute Resolution, or ODR (p. 178).  Earlier 
work by Katsh and Professor Janet Rifkin explained that all successful 
dispute resolution systems can be conceptualized as a triangle whose 
sides represent three essential elements: convenience, expertise, and trust 
(p. 37).46  ODR adherents emphasize the role that technology can play 
in enhancing each of these elements, serving as a “Fourth Party” to aid 
the human parties navigating dispute resolutions (p. 37).  According to 
Katsh and Rabinovich-Einy, technology’s ability to enhance the exper-
tise side of the triangle in particular will most likely be the key to en-
couraging increased use of ODR (p. 38). 
Katsh and Rabinovich-Einy’s ODR perspective has much to recom-
mend it.  It provides a refreshing counterpoint to the laissez-faire, an-
tiregulatory framework of many internet scholars and activists.  The 
authors’ detailed knowledge of internet history (pp. 25–38), in particular 
of its regulation by the government (pp. 15–17, 26), keeps them from 
falling prey to the faux-libertarianism of many Silicon Valley enthusi-
asts.47  For example, when they discuss removals of Google search en-
gine results due to the much-maligned European “Right to be Forgotten” 
rulings, the authors point out that accidentally disclosed data from 
Google’s Transparency Report showed that “unlike the selective re-
quests disclosed by Google relating to criminals and public figures, the 
vast majority of requests came from the general public relating to more 
mundane privacy-related concerns” (p. 117).  Katsh and Rabinovich-
Einy take for granted what many internet enthusiasts are unable or un-
willing to recognize: that there is no progress, technological or otherwise, 
without regulation, and that quietism is no answer to the increasingly 
complex conflicts generated by evolving technology.  Rather, they argue 
that “the faster these new problems have grown, the more urgently we 
need to prioritize as a society thinking about how to prevent and resolve 
them” (p. 15).  Their project is energetically interventionist, seeking ways 
to maximize the benefits of innovative technology while minimizing its 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
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costs.  The authors’ primary goal seems to be quite simple and unim-
peachable: to help people achieve a happier and more productive rela-
tionship to the technology that increasingly dominates their lives (p. 3). 
According to Katsh and Rabinovich-Einy, the early years of cyber-
space, from 1969 to 1992, were relatively harmonious.  This was likely 
due to the fact that the small fraction of the population accessing the 
internet during that time was mostly made up of academics or military 
researchers; commercial activity on the internet was banned; and the 
World Wide Web, invented in 1989, was completely text-based (pp. 26, 
29).  Things began to change in 1992, when the ban on commercial ac-
tivity was lifted, and, shortly after, the first web browsers capable of 
displaying images and the first internet service providers (ISPs)  
appeared (p. 29). 
Once internet disputes started to emerge in earnest, it quickly be-
came clear that new resolution processes were needed in order for online 
activity to thrive.  The number of disputes that arise today in  
e-commerce alone is staggering: according to Katsh and Rabinovich-
Einy, “[i]t has been estimated that disputes occur in 3–5 percent of online 
transactions, leading to over seven hundred million e-commerce disputes 
in 2015” (p. 67).  One of the recurring themes of Digital Justice is how 
ill-equipped the court system is to deal with the exponential rise in dis-
putes: “No one — neither the courts, nor alternative processes — is pre-
pared to handle the volume, variety, and character of disputes that are 
a by-product of the levels of creative and commercial activity happening 
online today” (p. 14).  Exploring and developing the potential for tech-
nology to provide alternative, innovative routes to justice, they argue, 
could well “transform[] our very understanding of the meaning of jus-
tice” (p. 165). 
The authors’ online dispute resolution approach emphasizes the vir-
tues of convenience (p. 37), speed (pp. 74–75), user control (pp. 120–21), 
preferences for systematic (pp. 34–36) and preventive (pp. 17–20) efforts 
over discrete and responsive ones, and, of course, technology’s capacity 
to enhance all of these virtues (pp. 37–38). 
One of the greatest benefits of ODR, according to Katsh and  
Rabinovich-Einy, is its ability to increase access and convenience.  ODR 
“allow[s] communication at a distance, and asynchronously — with par-
ticipation at any time,” which “remove[s] many long-established physi-
cal constraints or boundaries of time and space” (p. 37).  In other words, 
ODR makes it possible for individuals to avoid the cost and inconven-
ience of travel and provides scheduling flexibility (p. 37).  This in turn 
allows resolution processes to proceed more quickly.  Speed is critical to 
effective dispute resolution, Katsh and Rabinovich-Einy explain, citing 
an eBay study that revealed that “buyers preferred to lose their case 
quickly rather than have the resolution process go on for an extended 
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period of time” (pp. 74–75).48  ODR also broadens the control users have 
over the dispute resolution process.  ODR tools help “create a space for 
users to discuss problems, feelings, and desired outcomes,” “allow[] . . . 
for direct user-to-user negotiation,” and help the “process [be] tailored to 
the characteristics of the parties and the dispute” (p. 121). 
Finally, ODR’s directive of “using technology to anticipate categories 
of disputes and design preventive systems” encourages the development 
of system-wide procedures over singular tools and preemptive tactics 
over after-the-fact responses (p. 19).  Katsh and Rabinovich-Einy de-
scribe the importance of gathering data “that reveals patterns of disputes 
and provides opportunities to both facilitate and monitor consensual 
agreements, thus making disputes in the future less likely” (p. 35). 
These are features well suited to pro-social disputes involving people 
who have a common interest, whether that is commerce, amicable sep-
aration, orderly work relations, or the maintenance of accurate records.  
One of the key characteristics of pro-social disputes is that all parties 
are generally invested in resolving the dispute quickly and efficiently.  
When the interests of powerful corporate or institutional entities roughly 
align with those of individual parties — the online bookseller wants 
customers to return, the courthouse operates more efficiently with accu-
rate records, the hotel has a strong incentive to avoid bad reviews — 
there is a strong foundation for effective and just dispute resolution. 
Katsh and Rabinovich-Einy’s conception of disputes is expansive.  
In Digital Justice, the authors bring the perspective of ODR to bear on 
a variety of topics — e-commerce, health care, the labor economy, courts 
and public institutions, and social media — treating subjects as diverse 
as medical record errors, online shopping refunds, abusive language in 
video games, and revenge porn as disputes.  While their ODR approach 
holds much promise for pro-social disputes, it is ill-suited to social media 
disputes that are deeply antagonistic and one-sided. 
III.  ANTI-SOCIAL DISPUTES 
The features of the online dispute resolution approach presented in 
Digital Justice that make it suitable for pro-social disputes often pro-
duce perverse results in anti-social disputes.  This is because the under-
lying conditions of many anti-social disputes are fundamentally different 
from those of pro-social disputes.  They are one-sided, antagonistic, and 
involve dramatic disparities of power as well as unjustifiable allocations 
of burdens and benefits.  They are better characterized as attacks than 
disputes.  The most damaging and widespread social media conflicts, 
including horrific Facebook Live videos, revenge porn, online harass-
ment campaigns, violent propaganda, conspiracy theories, and “fake 
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news,” almost always involve involuntary interactions.  Unlike buyers, 
sellers, and middlemen coming together online to engage in commerce, 
divorcing parents attempting to work out a child custody arrangement, 
or medical health professionals endeavoring to provide the best treat-
ment for their patients, anti-social conflicts involve murderers seeking 
audiences for their violence, revenge porn site owners profiting from 
sexual humiliation, and conspiracy theorists hounding the parents of 
dead children. 
In anti-social disputes, there is no presumption that all the parties 
are invested in resolving the dispute quickly.  In fact, one party may be 
deeply committed to dragging out the conflict as long as possible, the 
better to inflict prolonged harm on the other party.  In such cases, ODR’s 
features of speed and convenience will be irrelevant or ineffective.  The 
emphasis on user control can be used to perverse effect in anti-social 
disputes, allowing abusers to flood reporting systems with disingenuous 
complaints and false information.  As Katsh and Rabinovich-Einy them-
selves note, a “new ODR system can also be its own source of disputes, 
when the reporting system is abused by revenge-driven users reporting 
on other users” (p. 121). 
The powerful corporations that provide the technology and the plat-
forms for these attacks often have few incentives to stop them, and in 
some cases are incentivized to ignore or aggravate them.  Facebook, 
Google, Twitter, and others are not like hospitals or courthouses or li-
braries; they are not even like Amazon or eBay.  They produce nothing 
and sell nothing except advertisements and information about users, and 
conflict among those users may well be good for business.  As documen-
tary filmmaker and activist Astra Taylor writes in The People’s Platform, 
they are “commercial enterprises designed to maximize revenue, not de-
fend political expression, preserve our collective heritage, or facilitate 
creativity, and the people who work there are private employees, not 
public servants.”49 
A.  Technological Determinism 
When, as described above, Katsh and Rabinovich-Einy offer quali-
fied praise for Facebook for attempting to meet challenges posed by 
“anti-social media” (p. 109), they erase Facebook’s outsized role in cre-
ating those very challenges.  More troublingly, the authors of Digital 
Justice speak approvingly of the fact that Facebook created its dispute 
resolution system using “compassion research” connected to the highly 
controversial “Facebook Experiment” (p. 120).  In that experiment,  
Facebook manipulated the news feeds of approximately 700,000 users 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
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without their consent to study the impact of positive and negative feeds 
on their moods.50  Katsh and Rabinovich-Einy write: 
While the Facebook experiment received harsh criticism in light of lack of 
informed consent to the experiment, the compassion research project re-
sulted in the launching of a dispute resolution system through which users 
can alert their friends to content that is offensive to them, explaining how 
it makes them feel and what actions they would like to be taken by their 
counterpart.  (p. 120)  
In other words, the authors seem to believe that the fact that the exper-
iment produced useful results — at least to Facebook — outweighs the 
fact that it obtained this information by engaging in nonconsensual ma-
nipulation of users’ emotions. 
New York Times writer Farhad Manjoo expressed a similar sentiment 
in 2014, arguing that there was an upside to Facebook’s manipulation: 
It is only by understanding the power of social media that we can begin to 
defend against its worst potential abuses.  Facebook’s latest study proved it 
can influence people’s emotional states; aren’t you glad you know that?  
Critics who have long argued that Facebook is too powerful and that it 
needs to be regulated or monitored can now point to Facebook’s own study 
as evidence.51  
While Manjoo acknowledged that it was “problematic” that Facebook 
users did not consent to being experimented on, he asked, “if every study 
showing Facebook’s power is greeted with an outcry over its power, 
Facebook and other sites won’t disclose any research into how they 
work.  And isn’t it better to know their strength, and try to defend 
against it, than to never find out at all?”52 
It is worth noting that we know of this study only because Facebook 
voluntarily chose to make it public — in other words, we know only 
what Facebook wants us to know.  Manjoo sees only two choices: for 
the public to be told about being used as unwitting guinea pigs for  
Facebook or for the public to be permanently kept in the dark about 
what Facebook is doing with us.  The obvious third option — that Fa-
cebook should not experiment on its users without consent — is not even 
on the table.  Like Katsh and Rabinovich-Einy, Manjoo appears to think 
that we should both believe and be appeased by the fact that Facebook 
will use its illicitly obtained information to advance users’ interests in 
some way. 
Even as Katsh and Rabinovich-Einy acknowledge that Facebook’s 
dispute resolution system could be considered a form of “unpaid out-
sourcing, rendering users themselves responsible for ‘cleaning up’ the 
internet” (p. 120), they suggest that this is the best one can expect when 
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“platforms either adopt a ‘hands-off’ approach or fail to deal with the 
problem effectively” (p. 120).  The question they leave unasked is why 
these are the only possible choices.  Why can we not expect Facebook 
to take it upon itself to find an effective, direct way to handle the prob-
lem it helps create? 
Facebook’s response to the public outcry over the murders and rapes 
streamed on Facebook Live is a prime example of Facebook both taking 
a “hands-off” approach and failing to provide an effective response.  As 
discussed above, adding 3000 moderators to help review content flagged 
by users might reduce the platform’s response time, but it will not solve 
the problem.53  As writer Steve Coll observed in the New Yorker, “better 
software and detection tools might prevent some broadcasted suicides 
or violence but they cannot possibly stop all of it.”54  Facebook’s re-
sponse suggests that it either has no idea how to handle the problem it 
created, does not care, or both.  If we care about conflict prevention, as 
Katsh and Rabinovich-Einy suggest we should, Facebook Live should 
be a textbook case of how not to behave.  Facebook has helped unleash 
the scourge of live-streamed murders, rapes, and assaults on the world 
without taking any real responsibility for doing so. 
And indeed, why would it?  There is little incentive for largely un-
regulated, immensely profitable corporations to keep dangerous but lu-
crative products out of the public sphere.  There seems to be little polit-
ical or public will to demand that they do so.  When a new technological 
product is made available to the public, the public quickly becomes at-
tached to it, no matter how much harm it causes.  The possibility of 
removing it from the market is quickly rejected or dismissed outright.  
“The best way to prevent a graphic video from being seen is to never let 
it be uploaded in the first place,” writes reporter Emily Dreyfuss in 
Wired.55  But, she immediately concludes, “if you had to wait for  
Facebook’s approval of your video of a cat on a vacuum, you’d just post 
that video somewhere else.  Facebook would alienate a large constitu-
ency of people who want the ability to immediately and easily share 
their lives.  And Facebook can’t afford that.”56 
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In fact, as one of the wealthiest companies in the world, Facebook 
can afford pretty much anything.57  Facebook could certainly afford to 
take the time to think about how to address harmful uses of its products 
before making them available to the public.  According to several 
sources, Facebook rushed into the live-streaming-video business and 
was caught off guard by the problems it created.58  Zuckerberg pulled 
around 100 employees from other projects in early 2016 and instructed 
them “to work around the clock to roll out Facebook Live” in two 
months.59  As the Wall Street Journal reported, “[a]t traditional compa-
nies, major product launches often take years.  Technology firms, and 
Facebook in particular, emphasize speed even though they know it 
means there will be problems to iron out later,”60 living up to Facebook’s 
one-time motto, “Move fast and break things”61 (and its silent corollary, 
“Make Lots of Money”).  According to one source within the industry: 
In the desire to push Live out to as many people as possible, there were a 
lot of corners that were cut.  And when you take a fail-fast approach to 
something like live-streaming video, it’s not surprising that you come across 
these scenarios in which you have these huge ethical dilemmas of streaming 
a murder, sexual violence or something else.62 
Facebook could certainly afford to pass on a product if it determines 
that it cannot be used safely.  There is no reason to assume that  
Facebook’s continued existence and profitability depend upon the 
rollout of untested and potentially hazardous new features.  While it is 
no mystery why Facebook and other largely unregulated corporations 
would recklessly embrace potential revenue streams regardless of the 
harm they might produce, that is no reason for the general public to 
simply defer to this desire. 
Conflicts inspired by Facebook Live demonstrate the limits of Katsh 
and Rabinovich-Einy’s ODR framework in situations involving extreme 
disparities of power and a lack of shared interests.  The dispute resolu-
tion system Facebook created for young real-life friends to articulate 
hurt feelings to one another (p. 120) may indeed be admirable in limited 
contexts, but it is useless to the victims of aggressively anti-social attacks 
from abusive spouses, stalkers, white supremacists, or performative 
criminals.  Katsh and Rabinovich-Einy’s framework assumes that tech-
nology, no matter how harmful, poorly designed, or hastily introduced, 
should exist, and all that can be done in the wake of such technology is 
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to attempt to mitigate its worst effects.  The ODR framework encour-
ages the use of technology to resolve the conflicts technology creates — 
the “Fourth Party” doctrine of ODR (p. 37) — but not to reject the tech-
nology itself or to even seriously question its source.  While this ap-
proach may serve the interests of tech companies, it does not serve the 
interests of justice. 
Once we refuse to accept the inevitability or the supremacy of tech-
nology, we can think more broadly about how to address the conflicts it 
creates.  For example, there are several ways that Facebook could try to 
respond substantively to the criticism of Facebook Live.  The company 
could implement a delay similar to that commonly used in live television 
broadcasts.63  Or Facebook could impose some limitations on who can 
use the Facebook Live feature (the feature had in fact originally been 
restricted to celebrities).64  For instance, it could restrict use of the fea-
ture to users who have undergone an interactive training session that 
highlights permissible and impermissible uses of the feature.  It could 
revoke use of the feature from users who engage in harassing or other 
abusive behavior.  
For broader-based solutions, we would need to move away from in-
ternet exceptionalism and begin holding companies accountable for the 
harmful behavior their platforms facilitate.65  Companies like Facebook 
could be compelled to provide some form of cost-benefit analysis to the 
public or to a regulatory agency to explain why the rewards of a given 
feature outweigh the risks.  If they fail to do so, these companies could 
be prevented from making the feature available to the public.  As Coll 
writes:  
It is true that the advent of social media cannot be undone, any more than 
television could be regulated in a way that would fully prevent terrorists from 
exploiting it.  Yet every corporation is vulnerable — maybe a better word is 
accountable — when the choices it makes harm others, particularly when the 
harm occurs in pursuit of profit.66 
B.  Hidden Labor 
The technological-determinist framework tends to erase or obscure 
the question of who should be responsible for dealing with the negative 
consequences of technology.  Facebook’s user conflict resolution process, 
which Katsh and Rabinovich-Einy find so worthy of praise, shifts the 
burden of conflict resolution from the company to users.  But asking 
users to provide more free labor to solve the problems that the company 
helped create is not justice, but exploitation.   
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That kind of exploitation is central to Facebook’s vision.  Mark 
Zuckerberg’s lengthy February 2017 manifesto about the company’s fu-
ture touted the reliance on individual user labor as liberating and  
democratic: 
  The idea is to give everyone in the community options for how they 
would like to set the content policy for themselves.  Where is your line on 
nudity?  On violence?  On graphic content?  On profanity?  What you decide 
will be your personal settings.  We will periodically ask you these questions 
to increase participation and so you don’t need to dig around to find them.  
For those who don’t make a decision, the default will be whatever the ma-
jority of people in your region selected, like a referendum.  Of course you 
will always be free to update your personal settings anytime. 
  With a broader range of controls, content will only be taken down if it 
is more objectionable than the most permissive options allow.  Within that 
range, content should simply not be shown to anyone whose personal con-
trols suggest they would not want to see it, or at least they should see a 
warning first.  Although we will still block content based on standards and 
local laws, our hope is that this system of personal controls and democratic 
referenda should minimize restrictions on what we can share.67 
Facebook’s strategy of presenting exploitation as liberation is re-
markably successful.  In Move Fast and Break Things, film producer 
Jonathan Taplin writes: 
Mark Zuckerberg’s greatest insight was that the human desire to be “liked” 
was so strong that Facebook’s users would create all the content on the site 
for free.  In 2014, Facebook’s 1.23 billion regular users logged in to the site 
for seventeen minutes each day . . . that’s more than 39,757 years of time 
collectively spent on Facebook in a single day.  That’s almost fifteen million 
years of free labor per year.  Karl Marx would have been totally mystified.68 
Astra Taylor writes that “society’s increasing dependence on free la-
bor” is not only immoral but also “glosses over the question of who ben-
efits from our uncompensated participation online.”69  And benefit  
Facebook does: the company’s first-quarter earnings in 2017 were “$10.8 
billion in revenue, up 49 per cent on the same quarter last year, which 
gave it a profit of $4 billion for the first quarter of the year.”70  Facebook 
does not share those massive benefits with the users that create the con-
tent that drives its platform, to say nothing of attempting to compensate 
the people whose lives are ruined by the abuse Facebook helps facilitate. 
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Katsh and Rabinovich-Einy write approvingly of the efforts of com-
panies such as Facebook and Twitter to improve their responses to 
online conflicts (p. 122).  But many of the improvements that these and 
other major social media companies have made are the product of an-
other kind of free labor, in the form of uncompensated work done by 
victims and advocates.  For example, Facebook finally acknowledged 
the problem of violently misogynist content on the site and committed 
to making changes following an intense, months-long campaign led by 
Soraya Chemaly and the Everyday Sexism Project.71  The winning strat-
egy for that campaign was to target the advertisers whose content ap-
peared on graphic pro-rape and pro–domestic violence pages.72  Simi-
larly, Facebook, Twitter, Microsoft, and Google banned nonconsensual 
pornography (a.k.a. “revenge porn”) from their sites and established pol-
icies to request the removal of private material only after years of re-
search memos, presentations, meetings, and collaborations with non-
profit organizations such as the Cyber Civil Rights Initiative.73 
In addition to free labor, Facebook, like most major tech companies, 
relies on low-paid labor for much of its content-moderation work.74  As 
journalist Adrian Chen wrote in Wired, much content moderation is 
done in the Philippines, a country that “has maintained close cultural 
ties to the United States, which content-moderation companies say helps 
Filipinos determine what Americans find offensive.  And moderators in 
the Philippines can be hired for a fraction of American wages.”75  These 
companies appear to be largely unconcerned about the ethical implica-
tions of subjecting increasing numbers of employees to live videos of 
beheadings, child porn, rape, and torture as part of their daily job.76  
The long-term effects of exposure to this kind of content can be ex-
tremely damaging, and those performing this labor are often unprepared 
for the psychological toll it will take on them.77 
Facebook’s seeming lack of concern for the workers responsible for 
the vital, traumatizing work of content moderation was illustrated by a 
2016 security lapse that exposed personal details of more than 1000  
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Facebook content moderators who were tasked with screening out be-
headings, child pornography, and terrorist propaganda.  Of those af-
fected, “around 40 worked in a counter-terrorism unit based at  
Facebook’s European headquarters in Dublin, Ireland.  Six of those 
were assessed to be ‘high priority’ victims of the mistake after Facebook 
concluded their personal profiles were likely viewed by potential terror-
ists.”78  One of these moderators described being treated as a “second-
class citizen[]” compared to Facebook employees.79  According to the 
moderator, he received only two weeks of training before beginning his 
work, was paid fifteen dollars an hour, and was required to use his own 
personal Facebook account to log in to work.  “‘They should have let us 
use fake profiles,’ he said, adding: ‘They never warned us that some-
thing like this could happen.’”80 
Facebook is now the sixth largest company in the world by market 
capitalization.81  It can more than afford to pay the workers who per-
form some of the platform’s most disturbing and important tasks better 
wages and to provide for their security and mental well-being.  It can 
also, for that matter, do far more to absorb the costs generated by its 
various products, costs that are currently borne by vulnerable individu-
als and groups targeted for online abuse. 
C.  Hidden Biases 
While Katsh and Rabinovich-Einy are impressed by some of the dis-
crete tools developed by Facebook and Twitter, they are even more en-
thusiastic about the complex system of dispute resolution developed by 
Wikipedia, the largest free online encyclopedia (pp. 122–25).   
Wikipedia’s elaborate set of principles and rules for editing are indeed 
impressive.  As the authors describe it, Wikipedia has developed: 
[V]arious measures that would allow for constructive discussion and con-
sensus-building, while ensuring that quality is maintained and abuse is ad-
dressed or prevented.  These measures have included clear and predeter-
mined rules governing the editing process; a multilayered ODR system; and 
a hierarchy of editors with varying levels of authority in determining editing 
disputes and regulating editor misconduct.  (pp. 122–23) 
Katsh and Rabinovich-Einy also find much to admire in Wikipedia’s 
conflict-prevention efforts.  Wikipedia makes use of software programs 
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called “bots” to assist in editing vandalism (p. 125).  The automated pro-
cesses make it possible for Wikipedia editors to quickly detect vandalism 
operations that a human editor might never catch (p. 126). 
Wikipedia’s ODR system allows users with no experience in dispute 
resolution to create some of the site’s processes, a feature that the au-
thors find particularly meaningful (p. 124).  Katsh and Rabinovich-Einy 
write: 
It is the combination of the diversity in dispute system designer identities 
as well as the unique features of digital technology that have rendered  
Wikipedia’s dispute resolution processes different from the traditional of-
fline dispute resolution landscape.  This is evidenced in the relaxed attitude 
toward confidentiality . . . as well as the ease with which input can be 
drawn from a wide range of editors.  (p. 124) 
Wikipedia’s far greater success in using ODR compared to other so-
cial media platforms makes sense given the nature of the site.  Wikipedia 
editors are bound together by a common purpose, even if frequent dis-
putes arise among them about how best to carry out that purpose.   
Wikipedia disputes, then, appear to be more pro-social rather than anti-
social interactions.  The authors’ admiration for Wikipedia’s modera-
tion and dispute resolution system is echoed by others who study online 
communities, including Professor James Grimmelmann: “Wikipedia 
takes its community democracy as seriously as it can.”82 
But appearances of diversity and democracy can be deceiving.  A 
whopping eighty-four percent to ninety-one percent of Wikipedia editors 
are male.83  One of the reasons for this gender disparity may be related 
to the “gender gap” in leisure time.  In the United States as well as across 
the world, women have less free time to engage in unpaid, noncare ac-
tivities than men do.84  According to a 2013 Pew Research survey, men 
spend three hours more a week than women do on leisure activities.85  
But another reason is that the tiny number of women who do edit the 
site have experienced prolonged and severe sexual harassment by fellow 
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editors and have been actively prevented from engaging in efforts to 
remedy the situation.86 
In 2014, a female Wikipedia editor using the pseudonym  
Lightbreather was invited to join the Gender Gap Task Force, “a project 
by Wikipedia editors to examine why so few women participate on the 
site and why there’s a lack of coverage of notable women.”87  Male edi-
tors would repeatedly insert themselves into the discussions, challenging 
the need for the project.  Lightbreather quit the task force after a few 
days.  In 2015, she proposed “a women-only space on Wikipedia for 
female editors to support each other and discuss the specific barriers 
they face online”; Wikipedia users objecting to the effort announced in 
the “oppose” section of the discussion page that they would “fight this 
to the death.”88 
At one point, Lightbreather discovered that a fellow editor was post-
ing images on a pornographic website and alleging that they were of 
her.89  This was not the first time Lightbreather had experienced har-
assment related to the site; previously, she had asked Wikipedia admin-
istrators for a space to discuss how to enforce Wikipedia’s policy on 
civility.  On a page that was set up to discuss her request, a fellow Wik-
ipedia editor wrote, “The easiest way to avoid being called a cunt is not 
to act like one.”90  Lightbreather asked Wikipedia’s Arbitration Com-
mittee (ArbCom), “a panel of 15 elected users who have the final say on 
all arguments between editors,” to take up her case against the editor 
who posted fake pornography photos of her.91  The ArbCom refused on 
the basis that taking the case might “‘out’ the editor that had posted the 
pictures, or link his username to his real name.”92  At the same time, 
another editor had opened a case against Lightbreather, accusing her of 
having a “battleground mentality” based on her complaints about other 
editors.  ArbCom’s ruling in that case was to ban Lightbreather from 
editing for at least one year.93 
Journalist Jenny Kleeman, writing in the New Statesman in 2015, 
observed that “[i]nstead of being the egalitarian ‘sum of all human 
knowledge’” that Wikipedia’s founder, Jimmy Wales, had hoped for, the 
English version of the online encyclopedia “is mostly the sum of male 
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knowledge.”94  One editor found that almost 4400 female scientists who 
met the Wikipedia notability standards did not have a Wikipedia en-
try.95  In 2013, a reporter discovered that an editor had removed every 
female novelist from a list of American novelists and put them in a sep-
arate list titled “American women novelists.”96  According to historian 
Gina Luria Walker, Wikipedia does not look so different from the first 
edition of the Encyclopedia Britannica, which was written between 
1768 and 1771 by 150 men and no women.97  The volume “featured 39 
pages on curing disease in horses, and three words on woman: ‘female 
of man.’”98  As former Wikimedia Foundation contractor Sarah Stierch 
put it, “[w]hen white men have been editing history since day one, they 
don’t see this as a problem.”99 
Wikipedia’s much-praised moderation and dispute resolution prac-
tices give the appearance of diversity and of serving the interests of pro-
cedural justice.  But behind this appearance is the reality of bias against 
women.  Discovering this requires looking beyond appearances — be-
yond procedure — into the platform’s substantive commitments and 
practices. 
CONCLUSION 
“Disputes,” write Katsh and Rabinovich-Einy, “are the collateral 
damage of innovation” (p. 5).  While that may be true, it is also true that 
we do not all share the same risk of becoming collateral damage and 
that we do not share equally in the spoils of innovation.  While the 
online dispute resolution approach championed in Digital Justice holds 
great promise for improving procedural justice in commercial and insti-
tutional transactions, its idealization of technology makes it unsuitable 
for resolving anti-social interactions facilitated by social media.  The 
internet is currently overrun with violence, threats, revenge porn,  
propaganda, and conspiracy theories.  These conflicts, which dispropor-
tionately burden women and racial, religious, and sexual minorities, are 
facilitated by powerful tech corporations with little incentive to pour 
their considerable resources into eliminating them.  Resolving or pre-
venting these disputes requires the rejection of technological determin-
ism and engagement with the reality of consent, power, labor, and com-
promised intermediaries. 
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“[T]he internet is broken,” Evan Williams, co-founder of Twitter and 
co-creator of Blogger, told the New York Times in May 2017.100  “‘I 
thought once everybody could speak freely and exchange information 
and ideas, the world is automatically going to be a better place,’ Mr. 
Williams [said].  ‘I was wrong about that.’”101  Williams certainly 
wasn’t alone in the belief that technology was going to make the world 
a freer, more informed, and more interesting place.  But he is one of the 
few now willing to admit that the fantasy of technological utopia is just 
that: a fantasy.  Technology will not save us from ignorance, bigotry, 
greed, or violence.  It is not technology that can define justice; it is jus-
tice that must define technology.  
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